Signal 01 · · CCN Intelligence
Canada Has the Assets. Norway Is Showing How to Use Them
What happened
Morten Brandtzæg, chief executive of Norwegian ammunition manufacturer Nammo, has warned that Europe cannot rapidly separate its defence industry from the United States without weakening NATO’s readiness. European and American defence supply chains are deeply integrated. Nammo produces rocket motors used in American made AMRAAM missiles and is expanding production in the United States as demand for weapons and ammunition rises. The warning comes as European governments pursue greater strategic autonomy because of strained relations with Washington and delays in the delivery of some American weapons systems. Norway’s position offers a more practical interpretation of autonomy: increase national and European capacity while preserving the industrial relationships on which current defence readiness depends. At the same time, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni travelled to Oslo for the first official visit to Norway by an Italian leader in nearly fifteen years. Discussions covered energy, defence, critical minerals, Arctic security and bilateral investment. The leaders of Italian defence company Leonardo and shipbuilder Fincantieri joined the visit. Norway also possesses what has been described as Europe’s largest known rare earth deposit at the Fen Complex. A 2026 estimate placed the resource at approximately 15.9 million tonnes of rare earth oxides, including materials used in permanent magnets for electric vehicles, wind turbines and advanced defence systems.
Why it matters for Canada
The debate about sovereignty is often framed as a choice between dependence and independence. Norway is demonstrating a third model: managed interdependence. Strategic autonomy cannot be created through political declarations alone. Europe may want greater independence from the United States, but its weapons platforms, components, production systems and supply chains remain closely connected to American industry. Breaking those relationships before replacement capacity exists could reduce security rather than strengthen it. Norway is building greater national and European capacity while remaining deeply connected to the United States and NATO. Norway is also recognizing that strategic resources create lasting influence only when they can be processed, transported and delivered securely. A critical mineral deposit without processing capacity offers limited leverage. A defence manufacturer without protected intellectual property and secure suppliers remains exposed. An energy system vulnerable to cyber or physical disruption cannot provide dependable strategic security. Canada possesses many of the same foundational advantages as Norway: energy, critical minerals, Arctic geography, democratic credibility, defence relationships, cybersecurity expertise and access to major allied markets. The difference is coordination. Canada often manages defence, cybersecurity, energy, mining, Arctic security and industrial development as separate policy areas. Norway increasingly treats them as parts of one national strategic position. That distinction matters because physical resources are now inseparable from the digital systems that locate, extract, process, transport and protect them. A critical minerals project depends on operational technology, industrial control systems, logistics platforms, proprietary geological data and secure communications. Defence manufacturing depends on protected intellectual property, trusted suppliers and resilient production systems. Arctic infrastructure depends on satellites, sensors, communications networks and reliable identity and access controls. A cyber incident affecting any of these systems could interrupt production, compromise sensitive technology or weaken confidence in Canada as a trusted supplier. Canada’s opportunity is therefore larger than extracting more resources or spending more on defence. It is to connect resources, industrial capacity, cybersecurity and allied demand around a clear national strategy. Canada does not lack strategic assets. It has not yet assembled and protected them as a coherent source of influence.
What CCN sees
These developments are not separate stories. Norway is connecting energy security, defence production, critical minerals, Arctic geography, industrial investment and trusted alliances into a single strategic position. It is not attempting to produce everything domestically or separate itself from its allies. It is identifying the capabilities its partners cannot easily replace and building influence around them. Energy relationships create political trust. Defence production creates operational relevance. Critical minerals create future industrial leverage. Arctic geography creates enduring security importance. Cybersecurity runs through the entire model. Defence production, energy networks, mineral processing, ports, communications and Arctic operations depend on interconnected digital and operational technology. These systems must be protected against disruption, espionage, intellectual property theft and interference with industrial operations. As Norway becomes more important to allied supply chains, the systems supporting those capabilities become more valuable targets. Norway’s emerging advantage is therefore not independence from the United States or Europe. It is becoming increasingly difficult for either to secure itself without Norwegian capabilities.
What leaders should consider
Businesses should expect governments to evaluate energy, minerals, manufacturing, technology and infrastructure increasingly through national security and cybersecurity lenses. The value of a project will no longer be determined only by cost, demand and expected return. Governments and major customers will also ask whether it strengthens supply security, protects sensitive information, reduces geopolitical exposure and can continue operating through a cyberattack or physical disruption. Canadian organizations should determine where their capabilities sit inside allied supply chains and what would happen if their digital systems, operational technology or critical suppliers were compromised. Cybersecurity should be treated as part of industrial reliability, not simply as an information technology responsibility. A company cannot credibly present itself as a trusted defence, energy or critical minerals partner if it cannot demonstrate that its operations, intellectual property and supply chain relationships are protected.
What to watch next
Watch whether Italy and Norway convert their discussions into specific agreements involving energy supply, defence production, shipbuilding or critical minerals. Watch for investment and purchasing commitments connected to Norway’s Fen rare earth deposit, particularly arrangements that include European processing and manufacturing rather than the export of unprocessed material. Watch whether new agreements include requirements covering cybersecurity, technology protection, trusted suppliers and critical infrastructure resilience. Watch how Norway balances European demands for greater strategic autonomy with its deep industrial and security relationship with the United States. For Canada, watch whether federal and provincial governments begin connecting critical mineral development and defence procurement with cybersecurity, secure processing, allied manufacturing and Arctic infrastructure. The decisive question is not simply which countries possess strategic assets. It is which countries can organize, protect and deliver those assets as trusted capabilities that others need.
Source: https://www.ft.com/content/f88b1f1b-d00b-4aae-8ad6-de1302755333