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Can Canada Defend Its Arctic Without Controlling Its Critical Technologies?
Ukraine's experience with restrictions on Starshield, the military satellite communications system based on SpaceX technology, illustrates a growing challenge for Canada and other nations investing in modern defence capabilities. Prime Minister Mark Carney has pointed to Ukraine's experience as an example of why Canada is exploring European satellite systems to strengthen its ability to protect the Arctic. Defence Minister David McGuinty has also acknowledged the importance of developing sovereign satellite communications capabilities. The issue extends well beyond satellite connectivity. Modern military operations increasingly depend on interconnected technologies, including autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, navigation, cloud infrastructure, semiconductors, software and cybersecurity. Canada must distinguish between owning defence equipment, having access to the technologies that support it and possessing the sovereign ability to operate those technologies when access is restricted or international circumstances change. As Canada undertakes substantial investments in national defence and Arctic security, these distinctions should become central considerations in procurement, industrial development and international partnerships. Canada's sovereignty should be measured by what it can do independently during a crisis, not simply by what it owns during peacetime.
What happened
On November 12 and 13, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported renewed restrictions affecting Starshield satellite communications used by Ukrainian military forces. The restrictions reportedly affected equipment travelling faster than approximately 161 kilometres per hour. According to Ukraine, these limitations compromised its ability to intercept certain high speed Russian attack drones. The restrictions concerned the movement speed of connected equipment rather than the speed of the internet connection itself. Responsibility for imposing the restrictions remains disputed. On November 17, Canadian Defence Minister David McGuinty acknowledged that Canada was closely monitoring the situation and emphasized the importance of developing sovereign satellite communications capabilities. Prime Minister Mark Carney has also linked Ukraine's experience to Canada's interest in European satellite systems and the need for greater operational control in the Arctic. These developments follow the October 30 announcement of the Canada and European Union Alliance for the Future, which provides a framework for strengthening cooperation in strategic technologies, security, defence and economic resilience. Canada is exploring opportunities involving European satellite infrastructure, including IRIS², the European Union's planned secure satellite connectivity system, and Galileo, Europe's satellite navigation system. IRIS² and Galileo provide different but potentially complementary capabilities. Canada's exploration of these opportunities does not yet establish guaranteed operational access to all European satellite services. Canada is also investing in domestic satellite communications capabilities. An initial $2.3 billion military communications contract announced in August 2026 involving Telesat Lightspeed represents an important step toward strengthening secure communications in northern and remote regions. MDA Space is also expected to play a significant role in developing Canada's planned military satellite communications constellation, addressing coverage requirements particularly north of 65 degrees latitude. These investments suggest that Canada is pursuing a combination of domestic technological capabilities, international partnerships and diversification of critical technology dependencies. Ukraine's experience provides a reminder that access to commercially available technology during normal operating conditions does not necessarily guarantee unrestricted access during a military crisis.
Why it matters for Canada
Canada's Arctic sovereignty increasingly depends on its ability to monitor, communicate, navigate and respond across an immense geographic area characterized by extreme weather, limited infrastructure and significant communications challenges. As international interest in the Arctic grows, Canada must consider how technological capabilities will shape its ability to defend its territory, protect northern communities, monitor maritime activity, manage critical infrastructure and safeguard economic interests. Canada has committed $38.6 billion over 20 years to modernize its NORAD capabilities. The investment extends beyond traditional military equipment and includes surveillance, communications, command systems, northern infrastructure, scientific research and emerging technologies. The modernization framework includes approximately $15.68 billion for infrastructure and support, $6.96 billion for surveillance systems, $6.38 billion for air weapons systems, $4.23 billion for science and technology, and $4.13 billion for command and communications capabilities, alongside internal services. Canada is also pursuing a significant Arctic radar partnership with Australia and BAE Systems Australia. Agreements announced in June 2026 support the acquisition and development of advanced radar capabilities intended to improve Canada's ability to detect and monitor activity across northern approaches. The broader program exceeds $6 billion, with an initial capability anticipated by December 2029. This partnership provides an important example of how Canada can acquire foreign technology while negotiating technology rights, intellectual property arrangements and Canadian industrial participation. However, the effectiveness of Canada's defence modernization will depend on more than the amount of money invested or the number of Canadian companies receiving contracts. A drone manufactured in Canada may still depend on foreign semiconductors, satellite communications, navigation systems, operating software, authentication mechanisms and cloud infrastructure. A Canadian satellite operator may rely on foreign launch services, ground infrastructure, specialized components and internationally managed technology ecosystems. Similarly, aircraft, naval vessels, autonomous underwater systems, surveillance platforms and military command centres increasingly depend on software, cybersecurity and digital infrastructure that can be distributed across multiple jurisdictions. These dependencies are not inherently problematic. International collaboration allows Canada to access advanced technologies, benefit from economies of scale and maintain interoperability with its allies. The challenge arises when Canada lacks sufficient visibility into these dependencies or when restrictions imposed by external parties could compromise its ability to operate essential capabilities. Canada must identify which technological dependencies are acceptable, which require reliable alternatives and which capabilities are sufficiently strategic to justify domestic control. The Arctic also presents an opportunity to align military investment with civilian infrastructure development. Reliable communications, Earth observation, emergency response systems, navigation, energy infrastructure and autonomous technologies can strengthen national defence while supporting northern communities, maritime safety, environmental monitoring and economic development. Northern residents and Indigenous governments must be meaningful partners in the planning, deployment and governance of these capabilities. Canada should consider the Arctic not simply as a territory requiring protection, but as an environment in which Canadian technologies can be developed, tested, deployed and eventually commercialized internationally.
What CCN sees
CCN sees Ukraine's experience as an important illustration of the growing convergence of technology, cybersecurity, national defence, economic security and industrial policy. Canada's strategic challenge is not simply to purchase more advanced defence equipment. It is to ensure that the capabilities acquired through these investments remain available, secure and sustainable when they are needed most. CCN believes operational sovereignty should become a central consideration in Canada's defence modernization strategy. Operational sovereignty means possessing the practical ability to operate, maintain, secure, adapt and sustain critical capabilities under changing geopolitical, commercial and technological conditions. It does not require Canada to manufacture every component or eliminate every international dependency. It requires Canada to understand its dependencies and ensure that no unacceptable combination of external restrictions can compromise essential national capabilities. Buy Canadian must evolve into Build, Control and Sustain Canadian. Purchasing products from Canadian companies is important for economic development, employment, industrial capacity and innovation. However, the nationality of a supplier alone does not determine whether a capability provides meaningful operational sovereignty. A Canadian company may depend heavily on foreign intellectual property, software licensing, cloud infrastructure, specialized components and remotely managed services. Conversely, a foreign technology partnership may strengthen Canadian sovereignty if it includes appropriate operational rights, technology transfer, domestic maintenance capabilities, contractual protections and Canadian industrial participation. Canada should increasingly evaluate defence procurement based on the operational sovereignty delivered by each investment, alongside traditional considerations such as performance, cost, interoperability and economic benefits. Procurement frameworks should examine who controls software updates, encryption mechanisms, system access, operational restrictions, critical data, intellectual property and the infrastructure necessary to sustain a technology throughout its lifecycle. Canada should also distinguish between ownership and control. Owning a physical asset does not necessarily provide control over the software, communications systems, digital credentials or externally managed services that determine how the asset can operate. As military capabilities become increasingly connected and software driven, cybersecurity becomes inseparable from national sovereignty. The integrity of satellite communications, sensor data, autonomous navigation and military decision systems must be continuously protected. Canada must be able to detect unauthorized access, validate software updates, manage cryptographic credentials, maintain system integrity and respond to cyber incidents without unnecessary external dependencies. The ability of a provider to restrict a system remotely is not inherently a cybersecurity vulnerability. Such controls may serve legitimate safety, contractual, regulatory or security purposes. However, Canada must understand who possesses those controls, under what circumstances they can be exercised and what alternatives are available if access is withdrawn. Technological dependencies also create systemic risks. Different military platforms may appear independent while relying on the same semiconductor manufacturer, satellite network, cloud provider, navigation technology or software supplier. A disruption affecting one shared dependency could therefore compromise multiple capabilities simultaneously. Traditional supplier diversification does not necessarily produce technological diversification. These considerations create significant opportunities for Canadian cybersecurity and technology companies. Secure communications, identity management, cryptography, quantum resistant security, software assurance, autonomous system protection, secure cloud infrastructure, critical infrastructure monitoring and supply chain visibility can all contribute to Canada's operational sovereignty. Canada has an opportunity to use national defence investment to strengthen its domestic technology ecosystem rather than simply acquire finished products. This means providing Canadian companies with opportunities to demonstrate, validate, deploy and scale their solutions within government and defence environments. It also means ensuring that public investment contributes, where commercially and strategically appropriate, to lasting Canadian intellectual property, specialized expertise, industrial capacity and international commercialization opportunities. International partnerships will remain essential. The United States is Canada's closest defence partner, and cooperation through NORAD and NATO remains fundamental to Canadian security. Greater domestic capability and diversification through trusted European, Australian and other allied partnerships should complement rather than undermine these relationships. The objective is not to replace one international dependency with another. It is to establish a diversified ecosystem in which Canada can maintain essential operations even when individual technologies, suppliers or international arrangements become unavailable. Canada cannot realistically achieve complete technological independence. It can, however, negotiate stronger operational rights, develop domestic capabilities, diversify critical dependencies and establish resilient alternatives. The objective is not to eliminate international dependencies. It is to ensure those dependencies cannot eliminate Canada's ability to act. These principles extend well beyond national defence. Telecommunications companies, energy producers, financial institutions, transportation operators, healthcare organizations, food producers and other essential service providers face similar questions concerning technology dependencies, operational control and continuity of service. Canada's approach to defence modernization could therefore help establish a broader national framework for technological resilience, trusted procurement and economic security.
What leaders should consider
Government officials, defence procurement leaders, military commanders, technology executives, cybersecurity professionals, infrastructure operators, investors and corporate boards should consider integrating operational sovereignty into their strategic planning, governance and procurement decisions. Defence Procurement: Evaluate the degree of operational sovereignty delivered by major technology investments. Consider the ability to operate, maintain, repair, secure and adapt systems domestically, alongside acquisition costs, performance and interoperability. Technology Dependency Mapping: Identify the critical suppliers, jurisdictions, components, software platforms, communications networks and digital services required to sustain essential operations. Determine whether apparently independent systems share common dependencies. Contractual and Operational Rights: Establish clear contractual provisions concerning software updates, system access, data ownership, intellectual property, maintenance, operational restrictions and continuity of service. Understand which restrictions may be imposed by suppliers, governments or regulatory authorities. Cybersecurity and Technology Assurance: Require appropriate independent assurance concerning the security and integrity of critical systems, software, communications infrastructure and technology supply chains. Integrate secure identity management, cryptographic resilience, access governance and incident response into procurement and operational requirements. Operational Resilience: Test the consequences of losing access to foreign satellite connectivity, navigation services, cloud infrastructure, software licensing, specialized components or other essential technologies. Develop alternatives proportionate to the strategic importance and complexity of each capability. Canadian Industrial Development: Establish procurement opportunities that allow Canadian technology businesses to demonstrate, validate and deploy their solutions. Consider how defence investments can contribute to domestic intellectual property, skilled employment, specialized manufacturing, research and international commercialization. International Partnerships: Strengthen cooperation with trusted allies while reducing excessive concentration in individual technologies or suppliers. Prioritize interoperability, technology transfer, shared industrial development and reliable operational arrangements. Northern and Indigenous Participation: Include northern communities and Indigenous governments in the planning, development and governance of Arctic technology infrastructure. Evaluate opportunities to combine defence investments with communications, energy, emergency services, transportation and economic development initiatives that benefit local populations. Executive and Board Accountability: Ensure that senior leaders understand critical technology dependencies and their potential operational, financial, legal and reputational consequences. Incorporate relevant dependency assessments into enterprise risk management, business continuity planning and investment decisions. These measures should be proportionate to the size, complexity and strategic importance of individual organizations and capabilities. Their objective is not to impose unnecessary costs or discourage international partnerships, but to strengthen Canada's ability to act independently when circumstances demand it.
People to Watch
Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada; David McGuinty, Minister of National Defence; Stephen Fuhr, Secretary of State for Defence Procurement; Doug Guzman, Defence Investment Agency; Anita Anand, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Dan Goldberg, President and CEO of Telesat; Mike Greenley, CEO of MDA Space; Andrius Kubilius, European Commissioner for Defence and Space; Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine.
Organizations to Watch
Department of National Defence, Canadian Armed Forces, Defence Investment Agency, Communications Security Establishment, Canadian Space Agency, Telesat, MDA Space, SpaceX, NORAD, NATO, European Commission, European Space Agency, European Union Agency for the Space Programme, SpaceRISE, SES, Eutelsat, ICEYE, Nokia, BAE Systems Australia, Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries, Arctic and northern Indigenous governments and development organizations. Developments to monitor include Canada's potential participation in European secure satellite communications and navigation programs, deployment of Telesat Lightspeed, development of Canada's military satellite communications constellation, Arctic radar procurement, operational developments in Ukraine, evolving restrictions on commercially provided defence technologies, Canadian participation in international defence supply chains and emerging operational sovereignty requirements in defence procurement contracts. Of particular interest will be whether Canada's substantial defence investments translate into lasting domestic intellectual property, industrial capabilities, skilled employment, commercialization opportunities and independently sustainable operational capabilities.